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GERMAN WORKS COUNCILS AND THE ANATOMY OF WAGESAbstract
This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the effect of German works 
councils on wages, using matched employer-employee data from the German LIAB 
for 2001. In general, we find that works councils are associated with higher earnings, 
even after accounting for worker and establishment heterogeneity. At this level, the 
works council premium exceeds the collective bargaining mark-up, and is modestly 
higher in the presence of collective bargaining once we account for worker selection 
into the two institutions. More specifically, works councils do seem to benefit women 
relatively and to build on collective bargaining in this regard. They also seem to favor 
foreign, east-German, and service-sector workers although the effects of collective 
bargaining  are not always   reinforcing.   The  evidence  from quantile  regressions 
suggests that only in conjunction with collective bargaining is the narrowing influence 
of works councils really clear-cut. The above findings pertain to workers in all plants. 
Once we consider smaller establishments with 21-100 employees, however, each of 
these results is further qualified, beginning with the effect on wage levels where 
premia are now only observed in conjunction with collective bargaining.  
JEL Classification: J31, J50.
Keywords: works councils, collective bargaining coverage, matched employer-employee data, 
wages, wage distribution. 
2The effects of German works councils on most aspects of firm performance – 
profitability,   labor   productivity,   and   employment   growth   (and,   more   recently, 
investment in tangible capital) – have been increasingly scrutinized since the late 
1980s. (For a review of the developing literature, see Addison et al., 2004b; and, for 
some recent results for investment, see Addison et al., 2007). Altogether less well 
investigated have been their effects on wages. This seems odd because analysts 
reporting adverse effects on other outcomes have tended to rely on rent-seeking 
behavior, and not just heightened bureaucratization of the decision-making process, by 
way of explanation. 
On closer inspection, however, the comparative neglect of wage determination 
can be traced to data limitations.
1  Typically,  plant-level data sets used in the 
performance analyses referred to earlier only contain information on average wages, 
derived from information on the total wage bill and employment. A proper wage 
analysis requires the estimation of augmented Mincerian earnings functions on the 
basis of individual information, which also permit analysis of the wage distribution.
Progress has been made possible through the comparatively recent availability 
of linked employer-employee datasets. Not only can we now look at works council 
effects on wages holding constant human capital, demographic, and other individual 
(and plant) characteristics, but we can also inspect the entire wage distribution. This 
focus is appropriate because it might be argued that works councils seek equal pay and 
reduced earnings dispersion as an insurance strategy, reflecting the preferences of 
risk-averse employees (Horn and Svensson, 1986).  
In the present paper, we deploy one such data set, namely, the nationally 
representative linked employer-employee data set of the IAB which combines the 
3employment   statistics   register   of   the   German   Federal   Employment   Agency 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit) with plant-level data from the Institute for Employment 
Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und  Berufsforschung, or IAB) Establishment 
Panel. The conflation is a linked data set known as the LIAB. 
Our treatment proceeds as follows. We first briefly describe the institutional 
setting. Against this backdrop, the still sparse literature on works councils and wages 
is next reviewed. Presentation of a formal model precedes discussion of our findings. 
These are organized by wage level (for all workers, and by collective bargaining 
coverage,   gender,   schooling   level,   region,   sector,   and   nationality)   and   wage 
distribution (again for all workers, and by gender). All our regressions are then rerun 
for a subset of plants, namely, establishments with 21 to 100 employees. Among such 
plants works council powers are a datum, such that one aspect of works council 
heterogeneity is taken into account. Moreover, there is a more balanced representation 
of plants with and without works councils in this particular plant firmament. The 
threads of our empirical analysis, including some disparate results from the broad 
sensitivity test(s), are drawn together in a concluding section, which also contains 
some suggestions for further research.  
The Institutional Setting: Works Councils, Collective Bargaining, and the Dual 
System of Industrial Relations
Collective bargaining in Germany is formally based on trade unions and employers’ 
associations. With the exception of some firms that conclude their own agreements 
with unions (in our sample, just 8 percent of plants have single-employer agreements) 
collective bargaining over wages and conditions is conducted outside the plant, 
typically at industry and regional level (in our sample 53 percent of plants).
2 Decisions 
4on strikes and lockouts are similarly detached from the plant level. Works councils, on 
the other hand, focus on production issues, handle individual grievances, and are 
charged with the implementation of collective agreements at the plant level. They are 
excluded from negotiating plant agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) with local 
management on matters that are covered, or usually covered, by collective agreements 
unless expressly authorized to do so under the relevant sectoral agreement (under 
section 77(3) of the Works Constitution Act).
3  Even abstracting from the subtle 
complication introduced by firms that are not parties to a sectoral collective wage 
agreement (or Flächentarifvertrag), works councils have nonetheless typically been 
involved in wage setting for two main reasons. First, their extensive codetermination 
rights (noted below) convey power that can be exercised informally. Secondly, wage 
drift has long characterized wage determination in German manufacturing. One-size-
fits-all   collective   agreements   necessarily   do   not   allow   for   individual   needs 
(historically, those of the high fliers) and they have been accompanied by the lubricant 
of wage drift. Works councils have therefore actively participated in the fixing of 
wages above  Tarif  levels and the provision of special bonuses and allowances. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that collective bargaining agreements have always been 
accorded a higher status than workplace agreements.
The functions of works councils are fixed under law. According to the Works 
Constitution Act, works councils may be set up in all establishments with at least five 
permanent employees following a petition by a small group of workers or by a trade 
union represented at the establishment. Although mandated, then, works councils are 
not automatic. Works councilors are elected in secret ballot for a 4-year term, and they 
represent all workers not just union members. Although works councils are formally 
independent of unions, as a practical matter ties between the two agencies are close, 
5with just under three out of five works councilors being union members. Traditionally, 
they have assisted in union recruitment at the place of work. Because of this function 
they have been referred to as “pillars of union security” (Müller-Jentsch, 1995, p. 
610).
 The law provides the works council with far-reaching rights of information 
and consultation – in areas such as manpower planning, changes in work processes, 
the  working  environment,   and   job   content   –  together   with   an  explicit   set  of 
codetermination or joint-management rights on so-called “social matters.” The latter 
include   the   commencement   and   termination   of   working   hours,   principles   of 
remuneration, pay arrangements including the fixing of job and bonus rates, the 
regulation of overtime and reduced working hours, holiday arrangements, and health 
and safety matters. The works council also enjoys “consent rights” in matters of hiring 
and firing as well as job classification (the placement of workers in certain wage 
groups). Further, works council authority – as indexed by formal competence and size 
(including the number of full-time councilors) – is increasing in establishment size.
Over time the competence or authority of the works council has increased. The 
first Works Constitution Act in 1952, which still forms much of the basis of the 
information, consultation, and codetermination right of the works council, emphasized 
the independence of the works council and recognized only limited rights for unions in 
the plant. Works councils were also prohibited from striking, as indeed they still are. 
The second Works Constitution Act in 1972 materially extended the information and 
consultation rights of the works council in respect of management decisions involving 
changes in capacity,  working operations, and production processes, as well as 
strengthening codetermination rights by allowing for adjudication in the event of an 
impasse. It also improved the access of unions to the workplace and permitted them to 
6submit lists of candidates in works council elections, as well as allowing works 
councilors to hold union office. The most recent legislation – the 2001 Works 
Constitution Reform Act – sought to stimulate works council formation, to strengthen 
existing works councils (e.g. by increasing the number of full-time works councilors), 
and to improve the operation of the works council apparatus. In the latter exercise, 
cost was said to be secondary to democracy at the workplace (for details, see Addison 
et al., 2004a). That said, acceptance by management of the entity seems to have 
grown. The reason is that, while typically cut from the union cloth, works councilors 
are often seen as more pragmatic and flexible than unions. 
Since our data pertain to 2001, and specifically capture the situation on June 
30
 of that year, it might be argued that the latest changes in the law which became 
effective on July 2001 might influence the results. This is unlikely because there are 
no obvious signs of changes in works council representation in the anticipated 
direction in the immediate wake of the legislation. That is to say the reforms have not 
stimulated the introduction of works councils (see Bellmann and Ellguth, 2006). The 
more fundamental changes that have occurred in yet more recent years would seem to 
apply to both collective bargaining and works councils alike as the dual system of 
industrial relations has come under threat (see Addison et al., 2007). In short, there is 
no suggestion that the results reported here for 2001 are contaminated by legislative 
changes.
Literature Review: Works Councils and Wages
As was noted earlier, there is comparatively little information on the effect of works 
councils on wages compared with their effects on firm performance. The literature on 
the impact of collective bargaining proper on wages is also sparse (see below). 
7Beginning with studies that focus on works councils, the early literature presents a 
mixed picture. Thus, in their analysis of 60 firms in the metal working industry, using 
pooled data for 1977 and 1979, FitzRoy and Kraft (1985) fail to detect any positive 
effect of works councils on wages.
4 Rather, the authors attribute the adverse effect of 
works councils on their performance measure – specifically, firm profitability – to 
slower decision making rather than to rent seeking. By contrast, in an analysis of 50 
industrial firms in 1990/91, Addison et al. (1993) obtain a significantly positive 
coefficient estimate for a works council dummy variable in their OLS and least 
median of squares/reweighted least squares wage regressions (see also Meyer, 1995a). 
More recent studies using larger datasets offer some clarification. In an 
analysis of the first wave of the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel, covering manufacturing 
establishments   in   Lower   Saxony,   Addison   et   al.   (2001)   report   in   OLS   wage 
regressions that wages are approximately 15 to 18.5 percent higher in works council 
regimes.   The   authors   also   investigate   the   gap   between   the   wage   fixed   at 
industry/regional level and that paid at the establishment, using management-reported 
estimates of the percentage wage gap (übertarifliche Entlohnung).
5 The authors’ Tobit 
estimates fail to indicate any influence of works councils on the wage gap for either 
blue-collar or white-collar employees. However, in exploiting a question in the panel 
inquiring of managers whether or not the works council was jointly involved in 
determining the wage gap, Addison et al. (1997) report that the gap is higher where 
the works council is involved in wage determination.
6
Further differentiation is offered by the introduction of collective bargaining 
arguments proper and the extension of the wage argument. Using two waves of the 
Hannoveraner Firmenpanel, Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) offer a test of the Freeman-
Lazear (1995) model that, where a council either coexists with or is embedded in a 
8collective   bargaining   agreement,   councils   and   local   management   are   likely   to 
maximize the joint surplus. In contrast, where there is no collective agreement 
(external to the firm), there is said to be little to constrain rent-seeking councils.
7 
Interestingly, Hübler and Jirjahn report no evidence of an independent effect of 
collective bargaining on wages, which result they justify on the grounds that the 
outcome of collective agreements is usually extended to the overwhelming number of 
employees in an industry (but see below). For their part, works councils are found to 
have a positive effect on wages, which outcome is more evident for the uncovered 
sample.
8 (They are also associated with a well-defined positive effect on productivity 
in the covered sector.)
9                                                                                        
Rather stronger wage results are reported by Jirjahn (2003) using the 1994 and 
1996 waves of the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel. His OLS estimates results point to a 
works council wage premium in the order of 8 to18 percent. And this mark-up is 
higher in establishments without collective bargaining. This study also uses average 
wage data,  but unlike the previous study does not control for works council 
endogeneity.
In the only study using the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel to investigate skill 
differentials, Hübler and Meyer (2001) examine the determinants of differences 
between the highest effective wages of skilled and unskilled workers. Both industrial 
relations arguments are instrumented as in Hübler and Jirjahn (2003). The authors’ 
OLS estimates suggest that works councils reduce and collective agreements increase 
the wage spread.
For their part,  studies that examine the impact on wages of collective 
bargaining alone point to a positive effect of coverage.
10 Thus, for example, using the 
IAB Linked Employer-Employee data set for 1996, Kölling et al. (2005) find that 
9collective bargaining at sectoral level raises wages, at least for the least-skilled 
workers. Another study by Stephan and Gerlach (2005), again using linked employer-
employee data from the German Structure of Earnings Survey points to a positive 
premium for collective bargaining coverage. Specifically,  over successive cross 
sections of the data they report evidence of a rising wage premium for the average 
covered worker: 4 percent in 1991, through 9 percent in 1995, to 12 percent in 2001.
 
The   latest   linked   employer-employee   studies   examine   both   collective 
bargaining coverage and works council presence. Using LIAB data for the mining and 
manufacturing sector, Gürtzgen (2005) investigates the manner in which wages 
respond to rents (defined as value-added minus the opportunity cost of labor). She 
reports that rent sharing is unrelated to collective bargaining coverage once one 
accounts for unobserved individual and plant heterogeneity and the endogeneity of 
rents. These findings are consistent with those of Hübler and Jirjahn (2003), but the 
explanation is more specific: unions favor a compressed intra-industry wage structure 
and suppress the responsiveness of wages to firm-specific profitability considerations. 
Gürtzgen  further   reports  a well-determined   positive   association   between  works 
councils and rent sharing in pooled OLS estimates. Works council presence increases 
wages by 11 to 15 percent. Although this effect falls to between 2 and 3 percent after 
controlling for unobserved individual and plant heterogeneity, it is still statistically 
significant and, further, survives the application of dynamic panel estimators. Finally, 
Gürtzgen also provides results for specific groups of workers. Her fixed-effect 
estimates suggest that collective bargaining at sectoral level reduces interfirm wage 
differentials for males and females and by skill group, but the works council effect on 
rents is positive for males, blue-collar workers, and medium- and high-skilled 
workers.
11  
10In a follow-up paper, Gürtzgen (2006) estimates wage change models for 
individuals (and establishments) that change their collective bargaining status, using 
the LIAB data for 1995-2002, and confirms her earlier  result that centralized 
bargaining has modest effects, now increasing wages by 2 percent on average. Her 
base pooled regression estimates point to positive  cet. par.  effects of sectoral 
collective bargaining of around 5 percent (10 percent) in western (eastern) Germany. 
Corresponding works council effects are 5 (13) percent. The interaction term between 
works councils and collective bargaining is positive and statistically significant. 
However, other interaction terms suggest that collective bargaining reduces the returns 
to skill and gender.
Allowing for the nonrandom selection of workers and firms into collective 
bargaining regimes yields only a very modest collective bargaining differential (for 
western Germany) and few signs that collective bargaining influences the returns to 
worker characteristics. As far as the interaction with works councils is concerned, 
however, there is evidence of a modest increase in the returns to works councils under 
collective bargaining (albeit only for western Germany alone).  
The very latest treatments of collective bargaining of which we are aware seek 
to differentiate between union power, as measured by (net) union density, and actual 
bargaining   outcomes   as   reflected   in   different   regimes   of   collective   bargaining 
coverage (two types of collective agreement and individual contracts). The upshot of 
these investigations by Fitzenberger et al. (2006, 2008) using the German Structure of 
Earnings Survey is not altogether transparent, partly because of the new element of 
individual bargaining in covered firms (i.e. where not all employees are covered). But 
the main results would seem to be as follows. First, greater collective bargaining 
coverage is associated with higher wage levels and reduced inequality. Second, given 
11coverage status, higher union density is associated with lower wage levels. This latter 
dispersion effect carries over to the uncovered sector in the sense that an increase in 
density   lowers   wages   in   the   uncovered   sector   across   the   whole   distribution 
presumably via a spillover effect. But note that there is no separate identification of a 
works council impact, while neither union argument is endogenized.
 The implications of this literature review are fourfold. First and foremost, 
despite section 77 (3) of the Works Constitution Act, works councils may be expected 
to have some independent (positive) influence on wage levels, even if the manner of 
that influence along the skills continuum and the wage distribution is not transparent. 
Second, on the balance of the evidence, the influence of collective bargaining proper 
is altogether more clouded. Third, there is nonetheless the suggestion that collective 
bargaining may moderate or otherwise influence the wage effects of works councils. 
Fourth, and relatedly, it is inappropriate to treat the institutions of industrial relations 
as exogenous, notwithstanding the difficulty of accounting for their endogeneity.  
Despite these pieces of evidence on the wage impact of works councils, a 
specific analysis of their impact for different worker groups, bargaining regimes, and 
wage quantiles is still lacking. This is the justification for the present treatment. 
Relatedly, we seek some improvement in approach. In this context, some cross-section 
approaches  take into  account  the endogeneity  of  the  institution   and  collective 
bargaining status in wage equations but they are not explicit in revealing the economic 
hypotheses behind the instruments used; indeed, frequently they do not mention which 
instruments are used or do not  test the quality/viability of those instruments. For their 
part, the longitudinal approaches have the advantage of using internal instruments to 
tackle endogeneity. But longitudinal data is not a panacea in this regard. Potential 
problems stem from works council elections that take place only once every four years 
12and possible errors in data recording that works councils have ceased to exist outside 
of those years.
Methodology
Our starting point is the standard Mincerian earnings function in which individual 
(log) wages, yi, are a function of (observed) individual productive characteristics, X1i, 
to include both general and specific skills (proxied by schooling,  tenure, and 
occupation), and control variables specific to establishments, Zj(i). In particular, we are 
interested in the specific role of the works council institution, Wocoj(i), and whether a 
given establishment is covered by collective wage agreement, Collj(i). In a compact 
manner, the basic model can be then specified as follows:
(1)                     i i j i j i j i i e Coll Woco B Z B X y + + + + = 2 ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 1 d d .
It is natural to assume that this model suffers from heterogeneity bias (or omitted 
variable bias), in the sense that not all relevant individual (productive) characteristics 
are observed or collected by the researcher. If unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to 
be correlated with the observed characteristics, then it is straightforward to show that 
the (OLS) coefficients estimates of model (1) will be biased.
12 One way to control for 
heterogeneity bias is to assume that workers in the same workplace share some 
common  (unobserved) characteristics. Adding establishment-average characteristics 
X2j(i) to equation (1) may enable us to control for a key source of contamination (after 
Card and De la Rica, 2006). Accordingly, we have
(2)                     i i j i j i j i j i i u Coll Woco B Z B X B X y + + + + + = 2 ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 2 ) ( 2 1 1 d d
where, X1i, X2j(i), and Zj(i) denote the characteristics of workers, co-workers in the same 
establishment, and establishments, respectively,  Wocoj(i)  again  denotes the works 
council status of the establishment, and  Collj(i)  flags whether the establishment is 
covered by collective wage agreement of any type.
13Finally, there is the issue of self-selection of workers into establishments with 
(or without) a works council and with (or without) a collective agreement. The 
(testable) hypothesis here is that workers may choose a job based on establishment 
status with respect to either institution. Our preferred route to deal with this issue 
consists of using a bivariate probit approach in which the (two) worker choices are 
taken as interdependent. Using equation (2) above, this approach amounts to add two 
selectivity terms, one for each labor market institution, namely:
(3)                     
, ˆ ˆ                     4 3
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Coll Woco B Z B X B X y
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i lˆ  and 
Coll
i lˆ  are the estimated inverse Mills’ ratio terms obtained from 
running a bivariate probit in which the error terms of the choice models are assumed 
to be correlated. According to this procedure, we have the two models specified as 
follows:
(3’) 1 = i Woco  if  0 * > i Woco ,  0 = i Woco  otherwise,
with  i i i Woco 1 1 1
* e w + W =
and
(3’’)                   1 = i Coll  if  0 * > i Coll ,  0 = i Coll  otherwise,
with  i i i Coll 2 2 2
* e w + W = .
As it is shown below, the null of no correlation between   1 e   and   2 e   is 
rejected by the data. (For completeness, we will also comment on the results for the 
case in which we assume that the two choices are taken as independent of each other. 
In an alternative and final check, we will consider the case where the collective 
bargaining variable can be one of two types of coverage: firm- or sectoral-level.) We 
note that although the two sets of right-hand-side variables in the works council and 
14collective bargaining equations,  1 W  and  2 W , need not to be different from the set of 
regressors in the earnings equation, we find a subset of variables that can be shown to 
be statistically significant in the choice equations but not in the earnings equation. The 
variables in this subset – flat hierarchies, teamwork, and autonomous work groups – 
are then used as instruments in our identification strategy. We show that these 
establishment organizational characteristics have no influence on individual wages but 
that there is a positive (negative) correlation between two (one) of these worker 
involvement practices initiated by the management and the institutions of worker 
representation   “initiated”   by  the  employees   (i.e.   the  selection   of   workers   into 
establishments with works councils and collective bargaining) (see also Zwick, 2004). 
Team work and flat hierarchies seem to be complements with works councils 
and collective bargaining, and autonomous work groups substitutes. Arguably unions 
and works councils are not favorably disposed to workgroups with their own financial 
discretion, while plants without either industrial relations institution may encourage 
autonomous work groups as a means of improving their performance. On the other 
hand, teamwork and flat hierarchies may go well together with works councils and 
collective bargaining because employees might be intrinsically better motivated with 
less need for supervision.
 Model (3) is estimated for all workers and for men and women separately, 
using both OLS and wage quantile regression methods. We also present results for a 
number of separate sub-samples: manufacturing/services, eastern/western Germany, 
males/females,   Germans/foreigners,   and   for   five   different   qualification   groups. 
Proceeding in this way allows us to offer a detailed anatomy of the potential works 
council mark-up for different groups of employees.
15Data
Our data are taken from the 2001 wave of the LIAB. As noted above, the LIAB 
combines Federal Employment Agency employment statistics with plant-level data 
from the IAB Establishment Panel. The distinctive feature of the LIAB is the 
combination of information on individuals and details concerning the establishments 
that employ them. 
The employment statistics are drawn from the German Employment Statistics 
Register, which contains information on more than 98 percent of the employees and 
trainees included in the establishment panel (see Bender et al., 2000; Alda, 2005). The 
employment register was established in 1973 to integrate the notification procedures 
for   social   security   (pensions,   health   insurance,   and   unemployment   insurance). 
Information is recorded at the start and end of the individual’s employment spell 
within a firm and in annual end-year reports. The employment statistics contain data 
on the individual’s three-digit occupation, daily gross wage up to the earnings ceiling 
for social security contributions,
  gender, year of birth, nationality, marital status, 
number of children, and schooling/training. Each individual record also contains the 
establishment   identifier,   as   well   as   the   size   and   industry   affiliation   of   that 
establishment.
To take account of the top coding of earnings found for roughly 11 percent of 
the sample, we imputed wages for those employees at the censored level. To this end, 
we first created 20 cells differentiated by gender, education (the six schooling groups 
identified in Appendix Table 1) and nationality (German versus non-German), and ran 
censored wage regressions for each. The covariates comprised tenure, tenure squared, 
and three dummies for employee skills. (Our procedure recognizes that the level at 
which wages are top coded differs between eastern and western Germany.) Predicted 
16wages for each censored observation were then calculated and assigned for each 
individual.
For the purposes of the present inquiry it was also necessary to have data on 
length of tenure. However, and similar to the information on wages, the tenure data 
are also censored. In the case of western Germany some 9 percent of employees have 
their tenure censored (at 25 years of tenure), while for eastern Germany 35 percent of 
the sample have censored tenure data (at 10 years of tenure).  Since most of the 
censored individuals are employed in works council establishments, dropping them 
may be expected to materially bias the results. For this reason, we decided to impute 
tenure using the same procedure as described above for wages.
The plant-level component of the LIAB, the IAB Establishment Panel, was 
initiated in 1993 (Kölling, 2000). It is based on a stratified random sample – strata for 
16   industries   and   10   employment   size   classes   –   from   the   population   of   all 
establishments employing at least one employee paying social security contributions. 
Although larger plants are over-sampled, within each cell the sampling is random. In 
2001 the sample comprised 14,878 plants and some 2.5 million employees. 
The IAB Establishment Panel was created to meet the needs of the Federal 
Employment Agency for improved information on the demand side of the labor 
market.  Accordingly,  information  on the workforce and its  decomposition  and 
development through time are central elements of the Panel questionnaire. Further 
questions concern the establishment’s sales, exports, investment expenditures, age, 
and corporate form/legal status. Yet others include the size of the overall wage bill, 
training provision, hours worked, technical status of equipment, overtime payments, 
and collective bargaining status. Most such questions are asked annually.
17In summary, the LIAB is created by linking the employment statistics of the 
Federal Employment Agency with the IAB Establishment Panel via the plant identifier 
available in both data sets. We note that Gürtzen (2006, Table 1) provides tenure 
information on the basis of 1995-2002 LIAB data that do not take into account that 
tenure is left censored. The information on length of (potential) tenure first became 
available in the 2001 wave. This is an important reason to use this wave of the LIAB. 
Moreover,  since some key establishment variables pertaining to 2001 are only 
available in the 2002 IAB Establishment Panel, we merged this information with the 
2002 wave. Our selected establishments are thus required to be in both waves. 
Sectoral coverage includes manufacturing and services, and excludes not-for-profit 
organizations. In addition, only full-time individuals aged between 19 and 65 years are 
included in the sample (apprentices were excised). Finally, in order to include only 
establishments where in principle works councils can be present, we dropped all 
(workers in) establishments with less than five employees.  Matching the selected 
employees to the selected establishments resulted in an estimation/regression sample 
of 1,344,656 workers across 8,579 establishments.
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we also ran the same 
estimations for establishments with 21 to 100 employees. There are two reasons to 
choose plants within this size interval. First of all, the powers of their councils are to 
all intents and purposes fixed; otherwise, they are increasing in establishment size. 
Second of all, only a tiny minority of smaller plants with less than 21 employees have 
works councils while the large preponderance of establishments with more than 100 
employees have them (Addison and Teixeira, 2006). For our sample of establishments 
with 21 to 100 employees, roughly 38 percent of establishments and 45 percent of 
employees are covered by works councils.  
18We include a broad range of covariates in the earnings equation in order to 
reduce   unobserved   heterogeneity   to   a   minimum.   Besides   information   on   an 
individual’s gender, age, and tenure, we not only include four professional skill levels 
but also six schooling levels together with information on whether the individual is a 
German national or a foreigner and works in western Germany as opposed to eastern 
Germany. In addition to employment size and works council and collective bargaining 
status, our establishment-level variables also include information on whether the plant 
earns high profits in comparison to its competitors, if it exports, pays an overtime 
supplement, and employs modern technical equipments. Full details are given in 
Appendix Table 1.
Findings
Summary data on worker (mean) characteristics are given in Table 1A. The main 
differences between plants with and without works councils are as follows. First, 
workers in works council establishments have higher wages than their non-works 
council counterparts: log daily wages of 4.59 and 4.13, respectively. (The standard 
deviation of log wages is also higher in non-works council than in works council 
establishments at 0.373 and 0.477, respectively.) Second, job tenure is somewhat 
longer in establishments with works councils than in establishments without works 
councils: 13.54 and 9.76 years, respectively. Third, white-collar workers are more 
prevalent in works council establishments; conversely, blue-collar workers in the two 
lowest skill categories are outnumbered by those in non-works council workplaces by 
an 11 percentage point margin. Fourth, collective bargaining coverage is almost 
universal (94 percent) for workers in works council establishments but considerably 
lower in the case of plants without them (42 percent).
13 In sum, the observed worker 
characteristics in our sample are  reminiscent of those reported in the union-wage 
19literature: employees in works council establishments evince higher wages, higher 
skills, higher tenure, and lower wage dispersion.
 (Tables 1A and 1B near here) 
Corresponding establishment means are presented in Table 1B. Observe that 
there are fewer works council establishments than non-works council establishments, 
with the latter outnumbering the former by a twelve percentage point margin. 
Disparities with respect to the means reported in Table 1A reflect the fact that larger 
establishments (namely, those with 250 or more workers) have almost complete works 
council coverage. The difference in log wages in works council establishments is 
equal to 0.36 and tenure is 3.3 years longer. Collective bargaining coverage is also 
much higher in works council establishments. Finally, although not shown in the table, 
the establishment-level data point to lower tenure among women than men. Women 
are also much less likely than men to earn overtime supplements. These disparities 
may be expected to contribute to the observed wage gender gap of a little over 20 
percent in favor of men observed at the establishment (and individual) level. 
(Table 2 near here)
Table 2 presents the OLS wage regressions with different sets of regressors 
according to equations (1) through (3). The first column of the table confirms the 0.46 
(log) wage differential in favor of works councils earlier reported in Table 1A. This 
premium falls once establishment variables, including collective agreements coverage, 
and individual employee characteristics are added to the specification, suggesting that 
a material share of the wage gap can be explained by systematic sorting of firms and 
employees. Specifically, after adding worker and plant characteristics, the coefficient 
on the works council variable in column 2 implies an 11.9 percent wage premium 
[strictly (e
0.119  – 1) x 100] and this falls to 9.5 percent (column 3) with the further 
20addition of the average co-worker characteristics. The regressors have the expected 
signs. Thus, wages increase with age, tenure, qualifications, and professional status. 
They are lower for women and foreigners. Further, wages are higher in larger 
establishments and in establishments reporting high profits and paying overtime 
supplements.
The final column of Table 2 shows the results for the earnings equation once 
we control for the self-selection of workers into establishments by their works council 
and collective agreement status. As can be seen, the major implication of this 
endogeneity correction is a further decline in the works council coefficient, which now 
falls to 6.3 percent (row 1). Some comment is necessary on the exact procedure we 
have followed to obtain the results reported in column (4). It will be recalled that we 
decided to tackle potential endogeneity bias by first estimating a bivariate probit 
regression in which worker choices are taken interdependently and then adding to 
model (3) the two inverse Mills’ ratio terms – one for each institution (works council 
and collective agreements). Since in an instrumental variables approach all covariates 
of the earnings equation have to be included and we have no priors as to the specific 
set of instruments that should be included in each choice equation, we assumed quite 
pragmatically that they are exactly the same. (Indeed, as noted below, only a very few 
arguments failed to achieve statistical significance in either equation.) We use three 
organizational arguments – namely, flat hierarchies, team work, and autonomous 
working groups – as identifying variables in our approach. The full results of this 
procedure are remitted to Appendix Table 2, where the three instruments appear in the 
first   panel   of   the   table.   They   are   individually   and   jointly   highly   statistically 
significant
14 and have the expected sign while they have no influence in the earnings 
equation.
15  That is, flat hierarchies and team work increase the probability of an 
21individual being in an establishment with a works council and covered by a collective 
agreement,   while   autonomous   working   groups   seem   to   work   in   the   opposite 
direction.
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And what of the role of collective agreements? Taking into consideration only 
the results reported in the last column of Table 2, we recall that the works council 
wage differential in non-covered establishments (i.e. the works council coefficient in 
row 1) was 6.3 percent. In covered establishments, the last entry in the second row of 
the table shows that there is an extra premium of 4.3 percent for workers in 
establishments with works councils. In turn, in covered establishments without works 
councils, workers get a mark-up of 5.8 percent relative to their counterparts in 
establishments without collective agreements (and no works councils). Vulgo: there is 
no evidence of that the process of wage setting in Germany precludes the emergence 
of a significant premium for employees covered by collective agreements or that any 
such premium is moderated in works council settings.
The   interaction   of   works   councils   and   collective   bargaining   is   further 
investigated in Table 3A, where summary results of dividing the entire sample into 
two groups according to their collective agreement status (covered/not covered) are 
provided. In this way we are allowing all coefficients in the wage regression, not just 
that attaching to work council status to vary.
As can be seen from the first column of Table 3A, the coefficient estimate 
associated with the presence of the two institutions is roughly of the same magnitude 
as the sum of the first two terms in the final column of Table 2 (column 4).  In turn, 
the coefficient in the second column of Table 3A, which should be approximately 
equal to the works council coefficient in Table 2 (column 4), under the hypothesis that 
the pooling is valid, is somewhat higher than predicted. As a result, allowing for 
22differences   in   slopes   of   individual   attributes   across   covered   and   uncovered 
establishments, produces the result that works council impact on individual earnings 
in uncovered establishments is very roughly the same as in covered establishments. 
But it does nothing to suggest in the manner of the recent literature that collective 
agreements moderate wage pressure from below.
As a final robustness check on the role of collective bargaining, we also 
allowed for the case where the collective bargaining variable distinguishes between 
coverage by firm- and sectoral-level agreements. In this case, and to control for the 
endogeneity of workers’ decisions, we introduced three selectivity terms obtained 
from running three univariate probits: one for each type of collective agreement and 
one for the works councils variable. (The percentage of establishments covered by a 
firm-level collective agreement is approximately 8 percent of the total.) Apart some 
minor differences in the respective rates of return to worker and establishment 
characteristics across the two sub-samples, the main finding is that the works council 
effect does not seem to vary with the type of collective agreement. Indeed, the works 
council effect (corresponding to Table 3A) was found to be approximately equal to 10 
and 11 percent for sectoral and firm-level agreements, respectively. Both coefficients 
are highly statistically significant.
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(Table 3A near here)
Turning to the separate summary results by gender in Table 3B, we obtain the 
interesting ceteris paribus result that the presence of a works council benefits female 
workers in particular: the mark-up is 9.3 percent in the case of women as compared 
with 4.5 percent for men (row 1). Taking into account the interaction with collective 
bargaining, the joint presence of the two institutions implies a substantially higher 
wage than in circumstances where there is a works council but no collective 
23agreement coverage: 19.9 percent in the case of women versus 9.3 percent, and 14.5 
percent in the case of men versus 4.5 percent, together implying a wage differential of 
5.4 percentage points in favor of women. Since women have lower wages on average, 
this finding implies that the two institutions do attenuate the gender differential in 
Germany. This attenuation is also reported by Heinze and Wolf (2006), using a 
measure of the firm-specific gender wage gap, and by Gartner and Stephan (2004), 
using the decomposition suggested by Juhn et al. (1993).
(Table 3B near here)
Heterogeneity in the impact of works councils on the earnings of different 
employee groups is also confirmed in Table 3C, which provides summary results by 
schooling level. It can be seen that the wage premium associated with works council 
presence is crudely decreasing in the skill (or schooling) level, namely, from around 
9.8   percent   for   the   least   skilled   (secondary   education   without   a   professional 
qualification) to 6.3 percent (workers with a university degree). So there is some 
modest indication here as well that works councils per se play a role in wage 
compression, narrowing to some degree the wage gap between high- and low-
schooled individuals. This narrowing is again slightly more evident when we take 
collective bargaining into account: taken in conjunction the two institutions yield a 
relative premium of 4.5 in favor of the group with the lowest schooling level vis-à-vis 
the highest. 
(Table 3C near here)
Summary results for sub-samples based on location (eastern versus western 
Germany), sector (manufacturing/services), and nationality (German/nonGerman) are 
given in Table 3D. It can be seen that, while benefiting nearly all such groups, works 
councils are seemingly more favorable to foreigner workers and to workers in eastern 
24Germany, while workers in establishments with works councils earn more if they are 
employed  in the service sector. For their part, collective agreements are more 
favorable   in   manufacturing,   to   foreigners   and   (marginally   so)   to   workers   in 
establishments located in eastern Germany. The reinforcing wage effects of the two 
institutions taken together are more important than any resulting differential effects.
  (Table 3D near here)
Finally, Table 4 summarizes findings from fitting quantile regressions to our 
earnings data for all workers and for the gender sub-samples. Results are provided for 
the 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 quantiles. The all-worker results in the first row of the table 
point to a works council premium that is broadly increasing in earnings. Only when 
works councils are taken in conjunction with collective bargaining status do we 
observe a reversal of this trend: the premium declines from 19.6 (=2.0+6.1+5.6) 
percent in the case of the lowest quantile to 14.0 (=2.7+4.3+3.2) percent for the 
highest quantile. For males, the joint premium for the 0.2 quantile is 17.2 percent as 
compared with only 11.2 percent for the 0.8 quantile. The difference is more 
pronounced in the case of females, where the corresponding values are 25.4 and 16.5 
percent, respectively. These results again show that the institutions of industrial 
relations on net are associated with wage compression in Germany.
(Table 4 near here)
All the above results pertain to our full sample of establishments. As a 
robustness check, we now turn to corresponding evidence for a sub-sample of 
establishments employing 21-100 employees. This sub-sample is more homogeneous 
for the two reasons noted earlier: first, works council powers are virtually a datum 
within  this   size class  interval,   whereas  more   generally  they  are increasing  in 
employment; second, the distribution of establishments with and without works 
25councils is more even. But the sub-sample contains many fewer individuals (some 
100,000 workers in 3,000 establishments). 
Beginning with the descriptive statistics, for the sub-sample as for the full 
sample,   average   (log)   wages   and   job   tenure   are   higher   in   works   council 
establishments. Further, employees’ qualifications and age are also slightly higher in 
these establishments. Finally, plants with works councils are less prone to report high 
profits, use modern technical equipment, or pay overtime supplements. (In each case, 
full details are available on request.)
Appendix Table 3 contains cet. par. findings corresponding to those earlier 
reported for the full sample in Tables 3A through 3D. They show the following 
results. First, there is a clear reduction in the works council premium: compared with 
the full sample, the (poorly determined) works council coefficient is reduced by some 
60 percent. Second, the works council premium is higher in association with a 
collective wage agreement, especially for female workers. Third, in running separate 
earnings according to the presence or absence of a collective agreement, works 
councils have a much stronger effect on earnings where there is coverage: the works 
council premium is 8.7 percent versus a statistically insignificant 3.2 percent. Fourth, 
the works council coefficient estimate broadly declines with the skill content (albeit 
not monotonically), while if anything the effect of collective agreement coverage 
works in an opposite direction. Fifth, works councils and collective bargaining 
coverage have bigger mark-ups both jointly and severally in the cases of foreign 
workers and manufacturing.   
(Table 5 near here)
In Table 5, however, we present full results from the quantile regressions for 
the 21-100 employees sub-sample. As it can be seen, all works councils are again 
26more favorable to women than men, but there is also no indication of any independent 
works council role in reducing wage dispersion along quantiles of the distribution. The 
results are similar to those for the all worker sample even if the works council 
coefficient estimates are typically smaller. Again, only taken in conjunction with 
collective bargaining is there evidence of narrowing, which as before is more 
noticeable for females. On net, then, we can conclude that with some exceptions there 
is broad consistency in the findings for the two samples. On net, then, we can 
conclude that with some exceptions there is broad consistency in the findings for the 
two samples.
Conclusions
This is one of only a few papers to examine in a detailed fashion the effect of works 
councils on wages. After controlling for worker and establishment heterogeneity, as 
well as the selection by individuals into works council and collective agreement 
coverage,   we  find   that  workers  in   works   council  firms   earn   more   than   their 
counterparts elsewhere. This result is prima facie consistent with rent seeking but it 
still remains possible that the premia stem from the payment of efficiency wages – or, 
alternatively, that initial rents are converted into compensating wage differentials. In 
subsequent work we propose to evaluate these two alternatives, exploiting differences 
in job tenure in the manner of Card and de la Rica (2006).
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Importantly, the works council premium applies more or less across the board. 
Thus it is observed by gender, schooling level, nationality, broad sector, and position 
within the earnings distribution. Only for smaller establishments with 21 to 100 
employees are works council effects often muted (see below).
27Works councils are of course embedded in the dual system of industrial 
relations in Germany, which is why we controlled for worker selection into each 
institution. For some time, it was assumed that coverage by a collective bargaining 
agreement was not a significant determinant of wages by virtue of the extension of 
collective agreements to the majority of employees in an industry. Latterly, this 
assumption has come under challenge and in common with some new research we 
report that collective agreement coverage is independently associated with higher 
wages. Issues of magnitude aside, we go further and report that this result obtains by 
gender, schooling (up to university level), nationality, region, across the earnings 
distribution, and indeed even for smaller plants across many of the gradients examined 
here. 
The association between works councils and collective bargaining proper has 
not been widely examined, although it has become widely accepted that collective 
agreements police the operations of works councils. In the words of Hübler and 
Jirjahn, 2003: 490): “Centralized collective bargaining reduces distributional conflicts 
at the establishment level. Our empirical results show that the impact of work councils 
on   wages   is   less   strong   in   covered   establishments   compared   to   uncovered 
establishments.”
19 As we have seen, this result is also echoed by some other observers 
even if few would go as far as Jirjahn (2003, Table 2) to claim that the interaction 
effect is actually strongly negative, or that the independent wage effect of works 
councils is twice as strong outside of collective bargaining. Our results are quite at 
odds with orthodoxy in this regard, although as we have intimated they have receive 
some recent support. Some specific results here are as follows. First, the interaction 
term is positive and statistically significant for all workers, for female employees (if 
not males), and across quantiles of the wage distribution. (It is also positive and 
28statistically   significant   for   German   nationals,   for   east   Germans,   and   for 
manufacturing). Second, taken in the round, considering the effects of works councils, 
collective   agreements,   and   their   interaction,   the   combined   wage   effect   of   the 
institutions of industrial relations as a whole is more strongly positive. This is 
especially true for the sub-sample of smaller firms where the independent works 
council effect is weaker. Third, redistributive effects in favor of lower wage groups 
where observed are more apparent when the institutions of industrial relations are 
taken as a whole. 
We have not reported other than  en passant  on the effects of collective 
bargaining at firm level and its relation with works council, but the evidence seems to 
indicate that once the establishment is covered, it does not matter much the type of 
collective agreement (firm- or sector-level), with the works council effect being 
approximately of the same size in the two situations. Frankly, we have less faith in 
modeling the determinants of worker selection into three types of industrial relations 
institution and hence in these findings. We have therefore chosen instead to paint with 
a broader brush. That said, the German dual system of industrial relations is coming 
under   increasing   devolutionary   pressure   and   the   consequences   of   this   more 
fragmented structure will demand more attention in future work both at the theoretical 
and empirical levels.  
29ENDNOTES
    1Arguably, some research may even have been deflected by the terms of the German 
legislation – the Works Constitution Act – that formally foreclose wage bargaining by 
the works council unless this is expressly provided for under the relevant sectoral 
wage agreement (see below).
       2Although we should note that since 1990 firm-specific agreements have become 
more common in Germany (see Hassel, 1999; Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003).
       3Recently, sectoral collective agreements have made explicit allowance for local 
bargaining through opening (and hardship) clauses – first in respect of working time 
and then for wages and salaries – although the bargaining parties at sectoral level 
retain the right to veto such agreements negotiated at plant level between the firm and 
the works council.
     4Rather, the wage relation observed is between union density and wages and even 
here the link is indirect.
    5Earlier research looking into the wage gap either reports no works council effect or 
even a negative influence (see, respectively, Meyer 1995b; Bellmann and Kohaut, 
1995).
     6The authors use two works council variables, the second identifying situations in 
which works councils are reportedly not involved in determining the wage gap. The 
omitted category is absence of a works council of any form.
    7Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) argue that it is in the interests of both the employer side at 
industry/regional level and the union to prevent works councils from rent seeking.
       8We do not here examine the works councils-performance nexus, but for recent 
treatments, see Addison et al. (2006, 2007) and Wagner et al. (2006).  
    9For an update of Hübler and Jirjahn’s wage analysis, using IAB establishment data 
for the Lower Saxony subsample, see Gerlach and Meyer (2007).
       10For a fuller survey of the bargaining coverage literature, see Fitzenberger et al. 
(2008).
    11See also Heinze and Wolf’s (2006) analysis of the gender gap within firms using 
wage data from the LIAB, 1997-2001. Not only do the authors find that the gender 
differential is smaller under collective bargaining but also in the presence of works 
councils (although interaction effects are not estimated). Interestingly, in neither case 
is the narrowing tendency is mediated by the proportion of females represented.
30    12For example, assuming  i i i a e e + =  and  i a j a i i a Woco X a ¢ + + = m f 1 , it follows from 
equation (1) that  ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 i i a j j a i i a Woco B Z B X y e m d f + ¢ + + + + + = . In this case, we 
can   conclude   that   both  
ols B1 and  
ols
1 d from   model   (1)   will   be   biased   as   the 
corresponding measured effects will include the biases  a f and a m , respectively (Card 
and de la Rica, 2006). Similarly, in the presence of an establishment-specific term, we 
would have   i j i i v a e e + + = ,   i a j a i i a Woco X a ¢ + + = m f 1 ,   j v j v i j v Woco X v ' 1 + + = m f , 
and  ) ' ' ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 i j i v a j j v a i i v a Woco B Z B X y e m m d f f + + + + + + + + + = .
    13We do not present in either this table or the next further disaggregations by gender. 
Suffice it to say that males earn more than females (log wages of 4.61 and 4.37, 
respectively) and have lower tenure. Familiarly, females are also much more likely to 
be employed in white-collar jobs. That said, there were no discernible gender 
differences in works council status or collective agreement coverage while differences 
in schooling level were inconsequential. 
    14The corresponding chi-square statistic with 6 degrees of freedom for the null of no 
joint significance is equal to 2,311.1 and the related significance level is better than 1 
percent.
     15The corresponding F-statistic is equal to 1.05, in which case the null of no joint 
significance cannot be rejected at conventional levels.
    16 We note that the null of no correlation between the error terms in equations 3’ and 
3’’ is also rejected by the data: the Rho statistic at the foot of Appendix Table 2 is 
equal to 0.38 (with a standard error of 0.0037.) Under the alternative hypothesis that 
there is no correlation between equations (3) and (3’), the results reported below for 
the full sample and for the separate sample of plants with 21-100 employees are very 
much the same.
  
       17Pooling the two sub-samples and running a model similar to that in Table 2, 
(column 4), there is however some indication that workers in non-works councils 
establishments who are covered by collective agreements at firm-level tend to earn 
less   than   either   (a)   workers   in   establishments   covered   by   sectoral   collective 
agreements and no works councils or (b) workers in works council establishments 
irrespective of the type of coverage.
31    18In a preliminary investigation of this issue, we estimated a tenure equation across 
all workers that included (in addition to detailed controls) predicted wages from an 
equation describing wages in establishments without works councils which was then 
interacted with works council dummy (present =1, 0 otherwise). The interaction term 
though positive was of small magnitude, suggesting that only a small part of the 
higher wages in works council plants reflect rent seeking. Details are available from 
the authors upon request.
       19We recognize that their argument applies more strongly to productivity than to 
wages. But that is another topic of inquiry in and off itself and is not further pursued 
here.
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(log) Wages 4.54 (0.41) 4.59 (0.37) 4.13 (0.48)
Tenure (in years)    11.33 (9.46) 13.54 (10.23) 9.76 (8.56)
Fraction female  0.28 0.27 0.34
Age (years) 40.9 (10.02) 41.0 (9.94) 40.0 (10.56)
Fraction in western Germany 0.79 0.82 0.54
Fraction foreign 0.08 0.09 0.05
Distribution by skill level:
   Unskilled blue collar
   Low skilled blue collar
   Highly skilled blue collar













Distribution by establishment size:
      5-20
    21-100
    101-249
    250-499
    500-999



















Distribution by schooling level:
    Seceduc1
    Seceduc2
    Terteduc1
    Terteduc2
    Polytechnic



















Fraction covered by collective 
agreement
0.88 0.94 0.42
Establishment founded before 1990 0.69 0.74 0.40
High profits 0.31 0.31 0.33
Modern technical equipment 0.75 0.75 0.72
Overtime supplement 22.58 22.69 21.25
Export 0.43 0.44 0.29
Fraction covered by works councils 0.90
Number of observations 1,344,656 1,171,597 130,811
Notes: A description of the variables is provided in Appendix Table 1. Standard 
deviations of the continuous variables in parentheses.
Source: LIAB Wave 2001.












(log) Wages 4.23 (0.47)     4.43 (0.40)  4.07 (0.46) 
Tenure (in years) 8.72 (8.21) 10.34 (9.45)    7.08 (6.62)   
Female 0.36 0.34 0.38
Age (years) 40.5 (10.5)     41.7 (10.1)     39.61 (10.6)    
Fraction in western Germany  0.62 0.69 0.56
Fraction foreign  0.05 0.06 0.04
Distribution by skill level:
    Unskilled blue collar
    Low skilled blue collar
    Highly skilled blue collar













Distribution by establishment size:
        5-20
      21-100
    101-249
    250-499
    500-999



















Distribution by schooling level:
    Seceduc1
    Seceduc2
    Terteduc1
    Terteduc2
    Polytechnic



















Fraction covered by collective 
agreement  0.61 0.84 0.42
Establishment founded before 1990 0.49 0.60 0.41
High profits 0.26 0.24 0.28
Modern technical equipment 0.69 0.71 0.67
Overtime supplement 17.10 17.9 16.38
Export 0.23 0.32 0.16
Fraction covered by works councils 0.44
Number of observations 8,579 3,589 4,612
 Notes: A description of the variables is provided in Appendix Table 1. 
Source: LIAB Wave 2001.
 
38Table 2. The Determinants of (Log) Wages, All Workers.





























































































































































Establishment size 21-100 0.034  0.025  0.025 
39(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)































































2 0.11 0.61 0.62 0.63
F 982 1,346 1,297
N 1,269,599 1,269,599 1,269,599 1,263,752
Number of establishments 8,178 8,178 8,178 8,118
 Notes: Dependent variable: log wages. Model specifications are given by equations 
(1) through (3) in the text. The model includes industry dummies in addition to the 
arguments shown in the table. Column (4) contains the inverse Mills’ ratio terms 
obtained from the bivariate probit model presented in Appendix Table 2. Each 
specification includes industry dummies in addition to the arguments shown in the 
table. Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the 
establishment level and are heterogeneity robust.
40Table 3A. The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Collective Agreement Status, 
Summary Findings
Collective agreement No collective 
agreement








Number of establishments 6,697 1,421
Notes: Dependent variable: log wages. The full specification of the model includes all 
other covariates shown in column (4) of Table 2.
Table 3B. The Determinants of Log Wages by Gender, Summary Findings
Males Females
















Number of establishments 7,568 7,390
Note: See Notes to Table 3A.  
Table 3C. The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Schooling Level, Summary 
Findings
Seceduc1 Seceduc2 Terteduc2 Polytechnic University

































2 0.54 0.59 0.51 0.55 0.45
F 175 874 422 324 320
N 170,009 807,554 64,348 57,715 97,897
Number of establishments 4,214 7,706 3,722 3,499 3,553
Note: See Notes to Table 3A.  
41Table 3D. The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Nationality, Location and 
Sector, Summary Findings
Nationality Location Sector

















































2 0.63 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.66 0.59








8,100 3,407 5,323 3,336 3,920 4,198
 Note: See Notes to Table 2.
Table 4: Quantile (Log) Wage Regressions, Summary Findings.
Quantiles
0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
All workers



























2 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.44
Male workers



























2 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.44
Female workers



























2 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37
Notes: Dependent variable: log wages. The full specification of the model includes all 
other covariates shown in column (4) of Table 2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
42Table 5. Quantile (Log) Wage Regressions, Establishment with 21-100 
Employees, Summary Findings.
Quantiles
0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
All workers



























2 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.39
Male workers



























2 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.42
Female workers



























2 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.34
Notes: Dependent variable: log wages. The full specification of the model includes all 
other covariates shown in column (4) of Table 2. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
43Appendix Table 1. Description of Variables.
Variable Definition
(a)
Wages Daily (log) gross wage (in €). Information on wages in the administrative data 
is right censored at the upper earnings limit for social security contributions. 
For such individuals, the predicted wage was obtained using separate Tobit 
regressions of the daily wage on tenure, tenure square, skill category, plant 
location (western vs. eastern Germany) and industry dummies. These separate 
Tobit regressions were defined according to gender, education level, and 
nationality, in a total of 20 different cells.
Gender (female) Dummy: 1 if worker is female, 0 otherwise.
Tenure Number of days since beginning work at the current establishment 
(implemented for censored values).
Employee skill groups Employees in the raw administrative records were classified into four groups: 
three blue-collar worker categories (comprising the unskilled, low skilled, and 
highly skilled) and one aggregate white-collar category made up of all white-
collar grades. The residual categories of home-workers, part-time workers, 
and apprentices were dropped from the sample.
Foreigner Dummy: 1 if worker has a non-German nationality, 0 otherwise.
Employee schooling 
groups
Employees in the raw administrative records were classified into six 
categories according to their education level: Seceduc1 (individuals without a 
completed apprenticeship and without an Abitur), Seceduc2 (individuals with 
a completed apprenticeship and without an Abitur), Terteduc1 (individuals 
without a completed apprenticeship and with an Abitur), Terteduc2 
(individuals with a completed apprenticeship and with an Abitur), 
Polytechnic (individuals with a Polytechnic degree), and University 
(individuals with an University degree).
(b)
Works council Dummy: 1 if works council is present, 0 otherwise.
Western Germany Dummy: 1 if the establishment is in western Germany, 0 otherwise.
High profits Dummy: 1 if the establishment reports a “good profit situation in 2001”, 0 
otherwise.




Dummy: 1 if payment is above collective bargaining tariff, 0 otherwise.
Modern technical 
equipment
Modern technology dummy: 1 if the plant’s equipment is either state-of-the 
art or up-to-date compared with other firms in the same industry, 0 otherwise.
Overtime supplement  Share of employees who receive paid overtime hours.
Establishment founded 
before 1990
Dummy: 1 if establishments was founded before 1990, 0 otherwise
Export market Dummy: 1 if the percentage share of exports in the establishment’s annual 
turnover is greater than zero, 0 otherwise.
Flat hierarchies 
(instrument)
Dummy: 1 if establishment reduced the number of hierarchies , 0 otherwise
Team work 
(instrument)
Dummy: 1 if establishment introduced team work, 0 otherwise
Autonomous working 
groups (instrument)
Dummy: 1 if establishment introduced working groups with financial 
autonomy , 0 otherwise
Size21_100 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 21 and 100, 0 otherwise.
Size101_249 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 101 and 249, 0 otherwise.
Size250_499 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 250 and 499, 0 otherwise.
Size500_999 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 500 and 1,000, 0 
44otherwise.
More than 1000 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is greater than 1,000, 0 otherwise.
Notes: Variables in panel (a) were extracted from the Employment Statistics Register, 
while those in panel (b) were taken from the IAB Employer Survey. See text, section 
IV.
 
45Appendix Table 2. Bivariate Probit Choice Model



















Tenure (in years) 0.045
(0.001)


































0.164    
(0.013)
Unskilled blue collar 0.079
(0.008)
0.054   
(0.011)
Highly skilled blue collar -0.037
(0.017)













-0.004   
(0.010)






-0.043   
(0.006)
Payment above collective agreement 0.291
(0.006)
8.839   
(17842)
Modern technical equipment -0.013
(0.005)














-0.160    
(0.017)
Average age   0.097
(0.000)




0.576   
(0.039)
Average unskilled blue collar   -2.186
(0.507)
-0.117    
(0.326)
Average low skilled blue collar -2.266
(0508)
-0.174   
(0.325)
Average highly skilled blue collar 0.537
(0.512)
0.640   
(0.336)
Average white collar -1.244
(0.507)
-0.072   
(0.325)
Establishment size 21-100 0.984
(0.013)
0.203   
(0.013)
Establishment size 101_249 1.819
(0.013)
0.495   
(0.014)
Establishment size 250_499  2.344
(0.013)
0.788   
(0.014)




Establishment size more than 1000 3.540
(0.015)
1.60   
(0.015)
Rho 0.38 (0.0037)  
Wald chi
2 (102)  (Prob > chi
2) 263575 (0.00)
N 1,276,518
Notes: The bivariate probit model is described in equations (3’) and (3’’) in the text. 
The model includes 16 sector dummies. Standard errors in parentheses.
 
47 Appendix Table 3. The Determinants of (Log) Wages for Different Samples, 
Establishments with 21-100 Employees, Summary Findings.
Sample
Coefficient (standard error)





All workers (without inverse Mills’ 
ratio terms)
0.027 (0.026) 0.061 (0.027) 0.037 (0.014)
All workers (with inverse Mills’ ratio 
terms)
0.025 (0.026) 0.061 (0.027) 0.036 (0.014)
Collective agreement 0.087 (0.009)
No collective agreement 0.032 (0.025)
Males 0.020 (0.024) 0.047 (0.026) 0.033 (0.014)
Females 0.046 (0.036) 0.082 (0.038) 0.036 (0.019)
Seceduc1 0.098 (0.037) -0.020 (0.046) 0.050 (0.030)
Seceduc2 0.035(0.027) 0.057 (0.029) 0.040 (0.013)
Terteduc2 -0.016 (0.046) 0.086 (0.049) 0.010 (0.029)
Polytechnic 0.016 (0.037) 0.063 (0.040) 0.061 (0.026)
University 0.005 (0.040) 0.062 (0.044) 0.070 (0.033)
German  0.023 (0.026) 0.065 (0.027) 0.034 (0.014)
Foreigner 0.096 (0.048) -0.054 (0.050) 0.101 (0.029)
Western Germany 0.001 (0.038) 0.055 (0.040) 0.002 (0.020)
Eastern Germany 0.054 (0.296) 0.069 (0.033) 0.047 (0.017)
Manufacturing 0.060 (0.028) 0.013 (0.030) 0.045 (0.014)
Services -0.003 (0.039) 0.101 (0.042) 0.016 (0.023)
 Note: see Table 2. 
48